Institutions, Complexity and the Land by Boydell, S
TS 6A - Good Governance in Land Administration 
Spike Boydell 
Institutions, Complexity, and the Land 
 
Integrating Generations 
FIG Working Week 2008 
Stockholm, Sweden 14-19 June 2008 
1/11 
Institutions, Complexity, and the Land 
 
Spike BOYDELL, Australia 
 
 





The importance of the institutional and organisational development of land administration has 
been recognised by the establishment of a FIG Presidential Task Force.  This paper develops 
aspects of property theory and institutional analysis through the lens of complexity, to support 
and contextualise the work of the Task Force. The institutions associated with land 
administration are living evolving systems that require a different approach in order to model 
their intricacies.  The concept of institutions and good governance is introduced through an 
explanation of the ‘rules’ influencing human behaviour.  The debate surrounding the 
individualisation of land titles in a developing country land administration system is 
challenged.  Critical to dealing with the complexity of the institutions surrounding land 
administration is an appreciation of the multiple stakeholders, together with an understanding 
of their respective aspirations and the framework of social definitions. 
   
The notion of complexity is contextualised from the perspective of small island developing 
states (SIDS) in the Pacific.  The foregoing highlights the need for the development, and 
acceptance, of a robust theory of the institutional change process.  The significant contribution 
of this paper is provided by evolving a hybrid model applicable to institutional development 
and change.  The model draws on the work of Smajgl and Larson, and synergises it with the 
volitional pragmatism offered by Bromley.  The paper concludes this short theoretical 
grounding by highlighting the need for a ‘shared imagination’ for institutional change in land 
administration that can inform and underpin the FIG Presidential Task Force on Institutional 
and Organisational Development.  
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There are many examples of well-intentioned (as well as politically motivated) donor aid 
projects that have failed to meet expectations of ‘building a sustainable national land 
administration infrastructure’ (Greenway and Enemark, 2007, p.4).  Such failure is often 
attributable to the complexity of the institutional arrangements and the aspirations of multiple 
stakeholders.  Often, such land administration projects have been driven by a narrow focus on 
access to land and security of land tenure.  The politics behind them is often an expression 
that the system in a donor country (or more broadly, the West) ‘works’ and can be transported 
to differing institutional arrangements with minimal adaptation. 
   
The institutions associated with land administration are living evolving systems that require a 
different approach in order to model their intricacies.  The concept of institutions and good 
governance is introduced in section 2.  An explanation of the ‘rules’ influencing human 
behaviour is provided and the debate surrounding the individualisation of land titles in a 
developing country land administration system is challenged.  Critical to dealing with the 
complexity of the institutions surrounding land administration is an appreciation of the 
multiple stakeholders, together with an understanding of their respective aspirations. 
   
A preliminary overview of stakeholder analysis is presented in section 3, leading into a 
reminder about social definitions in section 4.  The notion of complexity is contextualised in 
section 5 from a Pacific perspective.  The foregoing highlights the need for the development, 
and acceptance, of a robust theory of institutional change process.  This is provided in section 
6 by evolving a hybrid model applicable to institutional development and change that draws 
on the work of Smagl and Larson, and synergises it with the volitional pragmatism offered by 
Bromley.  Section 7 concludes this short theoretical grounding by highlighting the need for a 
‘shared imagination’ for institutional change in land administration that can inform and 
underpin the FIG Presidential Task Force on Institutional and Organisational Development.  
 
2. INSTITUTIONS AND GOOD GOVERNANCE 
 
‘Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction.  They are 
made up of formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (norms of 
behaviour, conventions, and self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement 
characteristics.  Together they define the incentive structure of societies and specifically 
economies’ (North, 1993). 
 
Institutional arrangements can be defined as the ‘rules’ influencing human behaviour – and 
these rules can be further broken down into two categories, formal (which tend to be 
enforceable) and informal (which are in many cases unenforceable; see Table 1). 
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Institutions are made up of components that are also attributes of individuals and societies 
(Greif, 2006, p.23).  It is important to bridge the divide between understanding institutions as 
rules or contracts (as is common in economics) and understanding them as cultural 
phenomena (as is common in other social sciences). 
  
TABLE 1:The 'Rules Influencing Human Behaviour  (Boydell, 2007) 
 
Formal Institutional Arrangements Informal Institutional Arrangements 
Constitutions Relationships 




Title Traditional Laws and Customs 
 
Appropriate systems need to be designed for local circumstances, given that “not only can 
institutions not easily be copied from one context to the other, the institutional arrangements 
might become ineffective over time as context, circumstances and desired outcomes change” 
(Smajgl and Larson, 2007, p.9) 
Taking the example of economic development in less developed countries, when viewed from 
outside of the country or region there is a risk that those looking in will be influenced by (or 
are promoting/perpetuating) a particular institutional footprint based on their perception of 
institution-as-rules arrangements from a different society (their own).  The transplantation of 
institutional arrangements was a key driver in the colonization process, where institutions 
appropriate to one (geographic and social) context were transplanted into a new context 
(Smajgl and Larson, 2007).  As a result, colonisers supplanted systems that were developed 
from a different heritage onto, for example, Pacific societies that had different perceptions of 
interests, emotions, and values.  There are many contemporary examples of perpetuating this 
approach (such as the external push for privatisation) through aid driven attempts to apply 
neo-liberal models onto emergent economies. 
There is some benefit in developing this example.  The external push for privatisation is 
largely being informed by what appears to be superficially attractive but simplistic solutions 
proposed by, amongst others, de Soto (2000).  They tend to argue that the panacea for the 
world’s poor is to receive a title for an individual block of land that could then be mortgaged 
to finance other activities. 
  
Though de Soto’s view on privatisation contains some interesting ideas, inherent in his 
argument is a move away from customary non-western systems towards individualism 
(Boydell and Holzknecht, 2003).  It has also been criticised as too simplistic, grossly 
overestimating the cadastral and bureaucratic capacity of developing countries (Home and 
Lim, 2004).  Thus, it is quite unsuitable to the currently existing and operating tenure systems 
in, for example, small island developing states (SIDS) across the Pacific.  While the pro-
privatisation literature correctly recognises problems with the quality of property rights in 
many developing countries, such as Pacific Island nations, its conclusion that privatisation 
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and individualisation of title is the best, or only practical, alternative is largely an unproven 
claim. 
 
A version of the de Soto model underlies the ongoing Hughes-Fingleton debate of recent 
times over privatisation of interests in customary familial or tribal property (Gosarevski et al., 
2004b;  Fingleton, 2004;  Gosarevski et al., 2004a;  Fingleton, 2005b;  Hughes, 2004;  
Fingleton, 2007;  Curtin and Lea, 2006).  The Gosarevski et al. argument follows a similar 
line to de Soto, suggesting that individualised property rights are the solution to development 
in the Pacific.  In attempting to influence Australia’s aid model to the Pacific they advocate 
the western individualised model that confuses land tenure and land use, conveniently 
overlooking the sacrosanct nature of customary institutional arrangements in the Pacific.  
Moreover, they add to the literature that inappropriately perpetuates the ‘communal’ myth (in 
this case in the context of Papua New Guinea).  They demonstrate an unfortunate lack of 
understanding of property rights, and wrongly interpret leasehold arrangements as facilitating 
a transition to individual property rights. 
   
The Hughes-Fingleton debate also approaches issues relating to customary tenure and 
possible ways to bring customary tenure into modern practice.  Hughes comments on these 
through the narrow focus of strict economics, but without apparently engaging with the 
underlying features of customary systems or practice.  Her argument is for replacement of 
customary tenure with the individualisation of land titles, preferably as individual freehold 
interests (Hughes, 2004).  However, there is now increasing acceptance in development 
circles that whilst important, ‘individual land titling often works   against the needs and 
aspirations of ordinary people’ in developing countries (see, for example, Lemmen et al., 
2007, p.3). 
  
Fingleton on the other hand approaches these issues from a much broader base, with respect 
for and knowledge of customary tenure, systems and practices.  He advocates a hybrid 
solution to the general problem (captured in the AusAID Pacific 2020 Land Output Paper; see 
Fingleton, 2005a;  Fingleton, 2007), through the ‘adaptation’ of customary tenure.  
Organisations and people run the risk of becoming ‘overconfident in how well-calibrated their 
strategies are’ (Dekker, 2006, p.7).  This view is recognised by Lemmen et al.  who recognise 
the urgent need in developing countries for a land information system that operates very 
differently from the ‘accepted’ western model, such as in their developing Social Tenure 
Domain Model (Lemmen et al., 2007). 
 
3. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
 
Taking the above example of contention (political, social and economic) over institutional 
arrangements, there is a need to balance both the formal and informal institutional interests of 
traditional landowners and communities, investors, government and other stakeholders.  
Comprehensive stakeholder analysis is often overlooked in institutional arrangements, leading 
to the potential for conflict particularly where economic aspirations for customary land are 
concerned.   
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Stakeholders are those who have rights or interests in a system.  They can include primary or 
secondary stakeholders; internal and external stakeholders; and interface stakeholders.  In 
exploring the commercial use of customary land to achieve economic development, 
stakeholders can be identified through asking, amongst others, the following questions: 
> Who are potential beneficiaries? 
> Who might be adversely affected? 
> Who has existing rights? 
> Who is likely to be voiceless? 
> Who is likely to resent change and mobilise resistance against it? 
> Who is responsible for intended plans? 
> Who has money, skills or key information? 
> Whose behaviour has to change for success? 
These questions can be refined by considering a range of parameters: The basics - 
men/women, rich/poor, young/old; Location - rural/urban dwellers, near to the issue/far away; 
Ownership - landowners/landless, managers, staff; Function - producers/consumers, 
traders/suppliers/competitors, regulators, policy makers, activists, opinion-formers; Scale – 
small-scale/large-scale, local/international communities; and Time - past, present, future 
generations (for an expanded overview on stakeholder analysis and related tools see, for 
example, IIED, 2005;  Ramírez, 2002). 
There are multiple stakeholders involved in any arrangement for the economic use of land.  
Each brings a different stake and level of power, and concern, to their relationship with other 
stakeholders (for an analysis of this see Vodoz, 1994;  Walker and Daniels, 1996;  Dubois, 
1998) 
 
4. SOCIAL DEFINITIONS 
 
The institutions that underpin land tenure systems, whether customary or western, are 
manmade social definitions.  Land tenure systems exist to serve the needs of the people 
(Crocombe, 1968), so the system adopted must accommodate the particular way of life of the 
people, their laws, and the physical environment.  The institution has to be adaptable, 
evolving as it passes from generation to generation with efficient modification.  Land tenure 
systems can only exist if a society is willing to enforce the institutions that they are grounded 
on (Marchak, 1998).  Ongoing conflict that cites land as a causal factor implies that society is 




Land tenure arrangements are complex adaptive systems.  They are complex in that they are 
diverse across the region, yet are made up of multiple interconnected elements (Waldrop, 
1992).  ‘Complexity theory tries to understand how simple things can generate very complex 
outcomes that could not be anticipated by just looking at the parts themselves’ (Dekker, 2006, 
p.6).  They are adaptive, in line with Crocombe’s (1968) view that they have the capacity to 
change to accommodate changed expectations and learn from experience.  The essence of this 
complexity was perfectly encapsulated by Siwatibau (2002, p.2): “They say that land, like 
financial and human capital, is a factor of production, which helps drive economic and social 
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development, generates national income, wealth, jobs and government revenue, combats 
poverty, improves the standard of living of all and ultimately entrenches social and political 
stability in any country.  Land tenure, like culture and tradition, stands to evolve organically 
over time within a society.  As in all things, changes and solutions have to be made and 
formulated.  Solutions must be formulated from within and must reflect national, family and 
individual needs and aspirations and the changing global, regional, national economic, social 
and political dynamics that determine our destiny”. 
 
This explanation of land as part of a complex system does not benefit from a purely 
reductionist inquiry, as at each stage of evolution entirely new laws, concepts and 
generalisations are necessary.  Such a challenge is not new. Research often isolates the 
different layers of a system and then analyses the impact of one institution in respect of, for 
example, a particular land resource in order to enhance the condition of that specific resource.  
This approach runs the risk of taking both the issue (resource) and the institution out of 
context.  This is why we need a systems approach to examining land issues. 
 
Institutions need to be understood as a part of the institutional layer they are embodied within, 
as well as a part of.  This includes the economic, ecological and social layers it might impact 
on or be impacted by (Smajgl and Larson, 2007).  To achieve sustainable economic 
development, countries have to balance the layer(s) of economic efficiency (defined in 
monetary value) with the manifold and unknown (and usually unknowable in monetary terms) 
contributions of natural system layers (ecosystems) and complex layers of social structure 
(custom – social structure and process - and tradition).  These multiple institutional layers 
evolve and adapt (often at a different pace) over time to contend with new scarcities, new 
tastes and preferences, new ethical premises, new technical opportunities, as well as 
aspirations of globalisation and societal expectation  
 
6. THE NEED FOR A ROBUST THEORY 
 
What developing countries need is not so much a mechanism for economic development, but 
rather a robust theory of to explain institutions and underpin institutional change.  Such a 
theory could build on the concept of what Bromley describes as prospective volition.  
Prospective volition is the human will to action, looking to the future, and deciding how the 
future ought to unfold for those who will inhabit that future, and for their descendents.  The 
point here is that values and beliefs – some might even choose to call these the ruling 
‘ideology’ – inform and shape the norms, rules, and entitlements (property relations) in an 
economy (Bromley and Yao, 2006).  A hybrid of the process of institutional change is 
summarised in Table 2. 
Institutional incoherence refers to a situation in which the legal foundations of economic 
transactions are degraded and dysfunctional.  The central challenge in collective action is for 
the decision group to reconcile the multitude of expressions and imaginings that individuals in 
the group hold about their expectations for the future.  The decision group can be operating at 
family, clan, tribe, provincial or national level.  If the institutional tier of the decision group is 
sub-national, the aspirations of that group will have to be reconciled with other layers (to 
enable change in formal institutions). 
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TABLE 2: Generic Institutional Change Process (Adapted From Smajgl And Larson, 2007, P.7 
And;  Bromley, 2004) 
 
Institutional process How individuals evolve changes 
1. Perception of change Impressions - individuals perceive a change in conditions they 
operate in – a change in environmental, social, economic or 
institutional conditions. 
2. Identification of 
causality 
Meanings - depending on their behavioural tendencies and 
attitudes, some individuals compare the perceived change with 
their mental models of why it might have happened, what its 
impacts could be, and come up with their own explanations of 
these causal relationships.   
3. Communication of 
the opinion on change 
Expressions - depending on their behavioural tendencies and 
attitudes, some individuals communicate their opinion of causal 
relationships within their social network; this may cause diffusion 
processes, depending on the individual’s position / power 
relations within the network, as well as perceived relevance of the 
change.   
4. Alignment of 
opinions 
Abduction - individuals align themselves, based on their opinion 
of causal relationships and motivation factors. 
5. Decrease of fitness 
of the existing 
institution. 
Reality - acceptance that existing institution is failing to meet 
individual and societal aspirations.  Consensus (based on fact, 
expectation, or myth) that changes are needed. 
6. Formation of new 
institutions. 
Imaginings - can be societal (informally) or through government 
policy and supporting legislation (formal), rather than at an 
individual level.  An individual is involved through their 
engagement with particular society or democratic process. 
7. Replacement or 
modification of 
existing institutions. 
Expectations - as with 6, can be societal (informally) or through 
government policy and supporting legislation (formal), rather 
than at an individual level.  Again, an individual is involved 
through their engagement with particular society or democratic 
process. 
 
‘Studying institutions sheds lights on why some countries are rich and others poor, why some 
enjoy a welfare-enhancing political order and others do not.  Socially beneficial institutions 
promote welfare-enhancing cooperation and action.  They provide the foundations of markets 
by efficiently assigning, protecting, and altering property rights’ (Greif, 2006, p.4). 
  
7. MOVING FORWARD WITH SHARED IMAGININGS 
 
Within the institutional context of any developing country, the challenge is to explore and 
reach consensus on where people / citizens want to be located between the extremes of 
traditional customary ways (which promote and respect informal institutions) and Western 
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materialism (which relies on formal institutions) 1 (see S1. in Boydell et al., 2002).  The task 
is to focus on the various reasons for disparate expressions that cause disparate imaginings 
amongst the respective decision groups.  
 
There are many examples in developing countries where formal and informal institutions 
often operate in parallel, this places the onus for institutional change on individuals – the 
people / citizens.  External absolutism has not proven successful.  Similarly, those leaders (of 
the various tiers of decision groups) who arrive at the question with their mind already made 
up tend to invoke absolutes where reasons are in order.  Pragmatism enables individuals to do 
the hard analytical work of figuring out what seems the better course of action, at this moment 
in time, to take.  ‘Pragmatists insist that those who advance absolutist claims share with us the 
reasons for their convictions’  (Bromley, 2004, p.83). 
 
Broad participation and shared imaginings will achieve a level of consensus that will 
minimise the risk of future conflict over the ensuing adapted / new institutional arrangements.  
To progress the notion of shared imaginings, joint action must result in a single choice 
(coordinated and coincident action).  This explains why collective action – public policy – is 
so contentious in so many countries.  Moreover, ‘consensus’ – the best thing to do under the 
circumstances - must be met with political acceptance by those charged with formulating a 
course forward. 
    
The process of institutional change highlights that whilst some financial and technical 
assistance is required in each developing country, the real challenge lies with administrative 




Boydell, S. (2007) Myth, Embeddedness and Tradition: Property Rights Perceptions from the 
Pacific. IN SMAJGL, A. & LARSON, S. (Eds.) Sustainable Resource Use: Institutional 
Dynamics and Economics. (London: Earthscan). 
Boydell, S. & Holzknecht, H. (2003) Land - caught in the conflict between custom and 
commercialism. Land Use Policy, 20, 3, 203-07. 
Boydell, S., Small, G., Holzknecht, H. & Naidu, V. (2002) Declaration and Resolutions of the 
FAO/USP/RICS Foundation South Pacific Land Tenure Conflict Symposium, Suva, Fiji, 10 - 
12 April 2002. Land Management and Development, University of the South Pacific,  
Accessed: 15/06/02, Web based PDF, Available at: 
http://www.usp.ac.fj/landmgmt/PDF/SPLTCDECLARATIONRESOLUTIONS.PDF. 
Bromley, D. W. (2004) Reconsidering Environmental Policy: Prescriptive Consequentialism 
and Volitional Pragmatism. Environmental and Resource Economics, 28, pp.73-99. 
Bromley, D. W. & Yao, Y. (2006) Understanding China's Economic Transformation: Are 
there lessons here for the developing world? World Economics, 7, 2, pp.73-95. 
Crocombe, R. G. (1968) Improving Land Tenure. South Pacific Commission, Noumea, New 
Caledonia, 72. 
                                                           
1 This was the first strategy in the Declaration and Resolutions of the 2002 South Pacific Land Tenure Conflict Symposium. 
TS 6A - Good Governance in Land Administration 
Spike Boydell 
Institutions, Complexity, and the Land 
 
Integrating Generations 
FIG Working Week 2008 
Stockholm, Sweden 14-19 June 2008 
9/11 
Curtin, T. & Lea, D. (2006) Land titling and socioeconomic development in the South Pacific. 
Pacific Economic Bulletin, 21, (1), pp.153-80. 
de Soto, H. (2000) The mystery of capital: why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails 
everywhere else, (New York: Basic Books). 
Dekker, S. (2006) Past the edge of chaos. Technical Report 2006-03, Lund University School 
of Aviation,  Accessed: 12/01/08, Web sourced PDF, Available at: 
http://www.lusa.lu.se/upload/Trafikflyghogskolan/TR2006-03_PastEdgeofChaos.pdf. 
Dubois, O. (1998) Getting Participation and Power Right in Collaborative Forest 
Management: Can Certification and the '4Rs' Help?  Lessons from Africa and Europe, 
EAEME European Postgraduate Programme in Environmental Management, Parma, Italy, 
Parma. 
Fingleton, J. (2004) Is Papua New Guinea viable without customary groups? Pacific 
Economic Bulletin, v.19, 2, pp.96-103. 
Fingleton, J. (2005a) Pacific 2020 Background Paper: Land. Pacific 2020 Background 
Papers, Commonwealth of Australia. 
Fingleton, J. (Ed.) (2005b) Privatising Land in the Pacific - A defence of customary tenures, 
(Canberra: The Australia Institute). 
Fingleton, J. (2007) Rethinking the need for land reform in Papua New Guinea. Pacific 
Economic Bulletin, 22, (1), pp.115-21. 
Gosarevski, S., Hughes, H. & Windybank, S. (2004a) Is Papua New Guinea viable with 
customary land ownership? Pacific Economic Bulletin, v.19, 3, pp.133-36. 
Gosarevski, S., Hughes, H. & Windybank, S. (2004b) Is Papua New Guinea viable? Pacific 
Economic Bulletin, v.19, 1, pp.134-48. 
Greenway, I. & Enemark, S. (2007) FIG's Contribution to Institutional and Organisational 
Development. Strategic Integration of Surveying Services, VILIKKA, M., Hong Kong SAR, 
China, FIG (International Federation of Surveyors), 14 pages, 
http://www.fig.net/pub/fig2007/papers/ts_2e/ts02e_01_greenway_1311.pdf. 
Greif, A. (2006) Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval 
Trade, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Home, R. & Lim, H. (Eds.) (2004) Demystifying the Mystery of Capital: Land Tenure and 
Poverty in Africa and the Caribbean, (London: GlassHouse Press). 
Hughes, H. (2004) Can Papua New Guinea Come Back From the Brink? Centre for 
Independent Studies - Issue Analysis, 49, (13 July 2004), 12 pages. 
IIED (2005) Stakeholder Power Analysis. IIED,  Accessed: 04/05/2005, Website, Available 
at: http://www.iied.org/forestry/tools/stakeholder.html. 
Lemmen, C., Augustinus, C., van Oosterom, P. & van der Molen, P. (2007) The Social 
Tenure Domain Model - Design of a First Draft Model. Strategic Integration of Surveying 
Services, VILIKKA, M., Hong Kong SAR, China, FIG (International Federation of 
Surveyors), 23 pages, 
http://www.fig.net/pub/fig2007/papers/ts_1a/TS01A_01_lemmen_augustinus_oosterom_mole
n_1373.pdf. 
Marchak, M. P. (1998) Who Own's Natural Resources in the United States and Canada? Land 
Tenure Center - University of Wisconsin, Madison, 11. 
TS 6A - Good Governance in Land Administration 
Spike Boydell 
Institutions, Complexity, and the Land 
 
Integrating Generations 
FIG Working Week 2008 
Stockholm, Sweden 14-19 June 2008 
10/11 
North, D. C. (1993) Economic Performance through Time. The Nobel Foundation,  Accessed: 
30/09/07, Lecture for the memory of Alfred Nobel, December 9, 1993, Nobel website, 
Available at: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1993/north-lecture.html. 
Ramírez, R. (2002) A conceptual map of land conflict management: Organising the parts of 
two puzzles. Sustainable Development Department (SD), Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations (FAO),  Accessed: 23/03/2002, FAO website, Available at: 
http://www.fao.org/sd/2002/IN0301_en.htm. 
Siwatibau, S. (2002) Welcome Address for the FAO/USP/RICS Foundation South Pacific 
Land Tenure Conflict Symposium, Suva, Fiji, 10 - 12 April, 2002. Transcribed by Boydell, S.,  
Accessed: Web based PDF, Available at: 
http://www.usp.ac.fj/landmgmt/WEBPAPERS/WELCOMEADDRESS.PDF. 
Smajgl, A. & Larson, S. (2007) Institutional Dynamics and Natural Resource Management. 
IN SMAJGL, A. & LARSON, S. (Eds.) Sustainable Resource Use: Institutional Dynamics 
and Economics. (London: Earthscan). 
Vodoz, L. (1994) La prise de décision par consensus: pourquoi, comment, à quelles 
conditions. Environnement & Société, 13, 57-66. 
Waldrop, M. M. (1992) Complexity: the emerging science at the edge of order and chaos, 
(New York: Simon & Schuster). 
Walker, G. B. & Daniels, S. E. (1996) Foundations of Natural Resource Conflict: Conflict 
Theory and Public Policy. Conflict Management and Public Participation in Land 





As Professor of the Built Environment, Spike Boydell takes a leading role in developing the 
research directions and achievements of the construction, property, urban planning, and 
project management disciplines in the UTS Faculty of Design, Architecture, and Building.  
He also leads the UTS Property Rights Research Group (PRRG), which specialises in land 
tenure and property rights research, advocacy, public policy development and consultancy.  
He is currently engaged in research projects on: the City as Common Property; Sustainable 
Urbanism; the Financial Management of Customary and other Land in the South Pacific; and 
the Politics and Economy of Emerging Property Rights (e.g. water, carbon, biota).   
Following an early high profile career in the property industry, Professor Boydell has held 
academic positions in Australia, the UK, and the South Pacific.  His doctoral research 
investigated the investment appraisal of enclosed regional shopping centres in Australia.  A 
property theorist and property rights specialist, the emphasis of his research over the last 
decade has been at the interface of people, place, and property.  He has served as a United 
Nations Visiting Expert on land tenure and property rights issues.  He is a Fellow of the Royal 
Institution of Chartered Surveyors, a Fellow of the Australian Property Institute, and a Fellow 
of the Institute of Valuation and Estate Management of Fiji. 
TS 6A - Good Governance in Land Administration 
Spike Boydell 
Institutions, Complexity, and the Land 
 
Integrating Generations 
FIG Working Week 2008 




Professor Spike Boydell phd frics fapi fivem 
University of Technology, Sydney 
PO Box 123, Broadway, NSW 2007 
AUSTRALIA 
Tel. + 61 2 9514 8675 
Fax + 61 2 9514 8777  
Email: spike.boydell@uts.edu.au 
Web site: http://datasearch.uts.edu.au/dab/staff/built-environment/details.cfm?StaffId=2198 
 
